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SUITS TO ENFORCE THE EDUCATIONAL 





IVAN E. BODENSTEINER· 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Children with handicaps have three primary sources of federal 
substantive rights relating to their education: the fourteenth amend­
ment to the United States Constitution; I the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA);2 and the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973.3 These sources are manifestations of judicial and legislative 
concern for the welfare of persons with handicaps and they articulate 
the scope of the child with handicaps' right to an education while 
delineating to some extent the remedies available when those rights 
are violated. Attorneys play an important role in vindicating the 
rights of persons with handicaps, but professional legal advocacy is 
not without cost. Because the "American Rule" generally precludes 
an award of attorney fees absent statutory authorization,4 the availa­
bility of such awards to plaintiffs who successfully enforce the fed­
eral substantive rights of children with handicaps is an issue of great 
significance. 
• Professor of Law. Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A.. Loras College. 
1965; J.D.• University of Notre Dame Law School. 1968. 
I. U.S. CONST. amend XIV. , 
2. Pub. L Ho. 94-142. 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1400-1420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981». 
3. Pub. L..No. 93-112. 87 Stat. 357 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.c. §§ 701-796b 
(1976 & Supp. V 1981». 
4. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y. 421 U.S. 240. 245 (1975). There 
are other exceptions to the American Rule. Thus. although fee awards can be based on 
contracts or the bad faith of a litigant. and can be awarded out of a common fund. these 
theories are generally not applicable to litigation on behalf of children with handicaps. 
The bad faith exception can. of course. be utilized in any type of litigation. but because 
its availability depends on the conduct of the opposing party it does not attract attorneys 
to this type of litigation. Alyeska recognized the inherent power of courts to award fees 
when court orders are willfully disobeyed or when a party has acted vexatiously. wan­
tonly. or for oppressive reasons either prior to or during the course of litigation. 421 U.S. 
at 258-59. See also Roadway Express. Inc. V. Piper. 447 U.S. 752. 765-67 (1980). 
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This article will examine each of the. federal substantive rights 
relating to the education of children with handicaps in order to de­
termine the availability of an award of attorney fees to successful 
plaintiffs. Initially, suits against public educational institutions 
based on the fourteenth amendment with a cause of action under 
section 1983, title 42 of the United States Code,s will be discussed in 
view of the provisions of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards 
Act of 1976 as codified in the same title under section 1988.6 The 
article will next explore the use of section 1988 to secure attorney 
fees in a successful action brought under the EAHCA, which does 
not expressly provide for an award of attorney fees. 7 Section 505(b) 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,8 which authorizes an award of 
attorney fees to prevailing parties, will then be discussed in light of 
the recent judicial limitations imposed on section 504 by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.9 Finally, this article will 
demonstrate that as a matter of litigation strategy, plaintiffs should 
normally assert substantive claims under all three of these provisions 
so as to afford themselves the greatest opportunity to secure an 
award of attorney fees. 
II. AUTHORIZATION FOR FEE AWARDS UNDER EACH OF THE 

FEDERAL LAWS PROTECTING THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS 

OF THE HANDICAPPED 

A. The Fourteenth Amendment 
It is generally recognized that the development of the educa­
tional rights of children with handicaps began with lower court deci­
sions based on the fourteenth amendment. This was acknowledged 
by the Supreme Court in Boardof Education v. Rowley,1O its first 
decision interpreting the EAHCA:. 
Both the House and the Senate reports attribute the impetus for 
the Act and its predecessors to two federal court judgments ren­
dered in 1971 and 1972. As the Senate Report states, passage of 
the Act "followed a series of landmark court cases establishing in 
5. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
6. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980». 
7. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(e)(2) (1976). While this section does provide for "such 
relief as the coun determines is appropriate," it/. etfons to include fees in this authoriza­
tion have not been highly successful. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text. 
8. 29 U.S.c. § 794a(b) (Supp. V 1981). 
9. See Southwestern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); infra note 
201. 
10. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982). 
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law the right to education for all handicapped children." 1 1 
Since the passage of the EAHCA arid the regulations l2 imple­
menting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as it relates to the edu­
cational rights of children with handicaps, several courts have 
recognized that children with handicaps seeking equal educational 
opportunities present substantial constitutional questions under the 
fourteenth amendment.D This argument has been enhanced by the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe, 14 which held that 
even though undocumented aliens are not to be treated as a suspect 
class and that education is not a fundamental right, discrimination in 
education is not to be "considered rational unless it furthers some 
substantial goal of the State."IS 
Even if children with handicaps, like undocumented aliens, do 
not constitute a susp'ect class, because education is involved the same 
intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied to equal protection 
claims in cases brought by children with handicaps. Therefore, 
whenever a child with handicaps claims a denial of equal educa­
tional opportunity, it is possible to state a substantial constitutional 
claim under the equal protection clause. Whenever a child with 
handicaps claims a lack of procedural safeguards, there should be a 
substantial constitutional claim under the due process clause. 
Assuming that children with handicaps can state a substantial 
claim under the fourteenth amendment, they have a cause of action 
under section 1983. Yet because both the fourteenth amendment 
II. Id at 3043 (quoting S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong .. 1st Sess. 6. reprinted in 1975 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1425, 1430. The two cases referred to in the Rowley 
decision are Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth. 334 F. Supp. 
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (preliminary injunction), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) 
(permanent injunction), and Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
12. 45 C.F.R: §§ 84.1-.99 (1982). 
13. See, e.g .. Monahan v. Nebraska. 687 F.2d 1164. 1172 (8th Cir. 1982); Roben 
M. v. Benton. 671 F.2d 1104. 1106 (8th CiT. 1982); Gary B. v. Cronin. 542 F. Supp. 102. 
120-23 (N.D. Ill. 1982); William S. V. Gill. 536 F. Supp. 505. 511 (N.D. 111. 1982); Turillo 
v. Tyson. 535 F. Supp. 577. 581-82 (D.R.I. 1982); Frederick L. v. Thomas. 408 F. Supp. 
832. 834-36 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Fialkowski V. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946. 957-58 (E.D. Pa. 
1975). Contra Colin' K. V. Schmidt. 536 F. Supp. 1375. 1388-89 (D.R.1. 1982). 
14. 102 S. Ct. 2382. 2398 (1982). It should be noted that Plyler involved a total 
exclusion from education and. therefore. differs from San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez. 411 U.S. I (1973) (Texas' school finance scheme does not violate the four­
teenth amendment). Because of the special educational needs of children with handi­
caps. cases brought on their behalf are more closely analogous to the total exclusion in 
Plyler than the "variation in the manner in which education is provided ..." 102 S. Ct. 
at 2398. found to be constitutional in Rodriguez. 
15. Id at 2398. 
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and section 1983 require state action or action under color of state 
law,16 the constitutional claims will be available only in suits against 
public schools and their officialsY The importance of the availabil­
ity of a substantial constitutional claim, which should be asserted 
through section 1983, lies in the fact that it can trigger an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to section 1988, regardless of whether the 
court actually decides the merits of the constitutional claim. So, for 
example, if plaintiff prevails under the EAHCA, an issue that should 
be resolved first in order to avoid the constitutional issue if possi­
ble,18 fees can still be recovered under section 1988. 19 
Application of the legislative history, which accompanied the 
1976 amendment to section 1988,20 is demonstrated by several 
cases,21 including some involving special education.22 It also applies 
where the plaintiff prevails through a settlement rather than full 
litigation.23 
16. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2750 (1982). In Lugar, the 
Court stated: "[I)t is clear that in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the 
statutory requirement of action 'under color of state law' and the 'state action' require­
ment of the fourteenth amendment are identical." ld. 
17. 	 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982). 
18. 	 See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543(1974). 
19. 	 This is made clear in the House Report accompanying the 1976 amendment to 
section 	1988 which states: 
To the extent a plaintiff joins a claim under one of the statutes enumerated in 
... [the Fees Act) with a claim that does not allow attorney fees, that plaintiff, 
if it prevails on the non-fee claim, is entitled to a determination on the other 
claim for the purpose of awarding counsel fees. . . . In some instances, how­
ever, the claim with fees may involve a constitutional question which the courts 
are reluctant to resolve if the nonconstitutional claim is dispositive. . .. In 
such cases, if the claim for which fees may be awarded meets the substantiality 
test. . ., attorney's fees may be allowed even though the court declines to enter 
judgment for the plaintiff on that claim, so long as the plaintiff prevails on the 
non-fee claim arising out of a common nucleus of operative fact. 
H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976) (citations omitted); see also Wolf, 
Pendent Jurisdiclion, Mull-Claim Liligalion and Ihe 1976 Civil Righls AI/orney's Fees 
Awards ACI, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 193 (1979). 
20. 	 ld. 
21. Compare Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir. 1980); Lund v. Af­
fleck, 587 F.2d 75, 76-77 (1st Cir. 1978); Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 574 
F.2d 423, 426-27 (8th Cir. 1978); Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1977), cerr. 
denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978) wilh Reel v. Arkansas Dep't of Corrections, 672 F.2d 693, 
697 -98 (8th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff lost constitutional claim but won on pendent state claim 
and was denied fees). 
22. Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F;2d 1164, 1172 (8th Cir. 1982); Robert M. v. Ben­
ton, 671 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1982); Gary B. v. Cronin, 542 F. Supp. 102, 120-23 
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 581-82 (D.R.1. 1982). 
23. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980); Gary B. v. Cronin, 542 F. Supp. 
102, 120-23 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
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Once it is established that a case is within the coverage of sec­
tion 1988, the decisions interpreting that section are very favorable 
to prevailing plaintiffs.24 For example, a prevailing plaintiff "should 
'ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances 
would render such an award unjust."25 A plaintiff does not have to 
prevail on all issues raised or achieve all of the benefits soughi,26 but 
can prevail through a settlement or consent decree or simply serve as 
the catalyst for change brought about without a settlement or con­
sent decree,27 and fees can be awarded against state agencies or state 
officials in their official capacities.28 Furthermore, public interest at­
torneys employed by funded organizations should be awarded fees 
and at the same rate as private counsel. 29 Although there are differ­
ent methods for computing the amount of a fee award,30 the hourly 
rate should generally be comparable to that prevailing in the com­
munity for other complex federal litigation.31 
These points suggest that section 1988 is a very attractive provi­
sion for prevailing plaintiffs where it is available, for example, when 
a plaintiff states a substantial constitutional claim. A more difficult 
question is whether a section 1988 recovery is available to a plaintiff 
who is without a substantial constitutional claim and who prevails 
under one of the federal statutory provisions.32 
24. While section 1988 authorizes an award of fees to the prevailing party. the 
legislative history makes it clear that there is a dual standard. and prevailing defendants 
are entitled to fees "only where a plaintiffs lawsuit was brought in bad faith in that it was 
clearly frivolous, vexatious or brought for harassment purposes." E.R. LARSON. FED­
ERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 87 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LARSOI"). 
For the legislative history supporting this proposition. see id. at 86-91. For court deci­
sions supporting the dual standard, see id. at 91-97. 
25. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); LARSON. supra note 
24, at 39-44. 
26. LARSON, supra note 24, at 51-62. 
27. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980); LARSON, supra note 24. at 62-74. 
28. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); LARSON, supra note 24. at 25-32. 
29. LARSON, supra note 24, at 99-113. 
30. fd. at 115-53. 
31. fd. at 155-240. 
32. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the issues which arise in determin­
ing whether a plaintiff has prevailed, the method of computing the amount of a fee 
award, or the procedures for obtaining an attorney's fee award as these matters are more 
than adequately addressed in other writings. See, e.g.. LARSON. supra note 24; C.... LJFOR­
NIA RURAL ASSISTANCE, INC.. FEDERAL liTlGATIOI" ATTORNEYS' FEES: A LEG.A,L 
SERVICES PRACTICE MANUAL (1981); Derfner, One Gianl Step: The Cil'i/ Rights Allor­
nt:}'s Fees Awards Act of /916.21 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 441 (1977); Sl'mposium: Allornt:rs 
Fees, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. (1979). 
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B. The Education/or All Handicapped Children Act 
The most likely source of fees for a plaintiff prevailing under 
the EAHCA is section 1988.33 This section authorizes fee awards to 
prevailing plaintiffs in cases which enforce various federal civil 
rights statutes.34 The EAHCA is not, however, one of the Acts men­
tioned in section 1988. Therefore, fees are available under section 
1988 only if the EAHCA can be enforced through one of the general 
civil rights provisions, such as section 1983. Thus, the initial ques­
tion that must be addressed is whether the EAHCA can be enforced 
through section 1983.35 
After the Supreme Court decision in Maine v. Thiboutot ,36 it 
seemed clear that section 1983 could be used to enforce any federal 
statute in suits against persons acting under color of state law.37 In 
Thiboutot, plaintiffs brought an action in state court to enforce sec­
tion 602(a)(7) of the Social Security Act38 and used section 1983 as 
the basis for the cause of action.39 After prevailing on the merits, 
plaintiffs sought fees under section 1988. The Court held that plain­
tiffs should be awarded fees because a cause of action had properly 
been asserted under section 1983.40 In a relatively short opinion, the 
Court relied on the "plain language" of section 1983-"rights . . . 
secured by the Constitution and laws ...."41 After examining the 
language, the Court stated: "Given that Congress attached no modi­
fiers to the phrase ["and laws"], the plain language of the statute 
undoubtedly embraces respondents' claim that petitioners violated 
the Social Security Act."42 A reasonable reading of Thiboutot would 
33. Another potential, but very speculative source, is the jurisdictional provision of 
the EAHCA. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(e)(2) (1976). See inya notes 154-58 and accompanying 
text. 
34. 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 20 U..S.C. §§ 1681­
1686 (1976) (title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). 
35. The discussion here will focus on section 1983. Section 1985(3), 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1985(3) (Supp. IV 1980), is another possibility but, because neither section 1983 nor 
section 1985(3) provide substantive rights and both serve only as a conduit to enforce 
other rights, the issues are similar under both. 
36. 448 U.S. I (1980). 
37. fd at II. 
38. 42 U.S.c. § 602(a)(7) (1976). 
39. 448 U.S. al 3. 
40. fd at 10-12. 
41. fd at 4 (emphasis by the Coun). 
42. fd For an alternative basis for the decision in Thihoutot based on the legisla­
tive history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, see Note, The Applica­
tion ofSection 198] to the Violation ofFederal Statutory Rights-Maine v. Thiboutot, 30 
DEPAUL L. REV. 651, 662-64 (1981). 
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suggest, therefore, that section 1983 could be used to enforce the 
EAHCA since it too is a federal statute.43 
It did not take the Supreme Court long to retreat from the ap­
parently broad, clear ruling in Thiboutot. First in Pennhurst State 
School and Hospital v. Halderman 44 and then in Middlesex County 
Sewerage A ulhority v. N allQnal Sea Clammers Association, 45 the 
Court substantially confused the issue. 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the applica­
tion of § 1983 to statutory violations. In [Pennhursl} we remanded 
certain claims for a determination (i) whether Congress had fore­
closed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself. 
and (ii) whether the statute at issue there was the kind that created 
enforceable "rights" under § 1983.46 
The second exception is not troublesome because a plaintiff cannot 
prevail in a section 1983 action where the substantive provision 
sought to be enforced conveys no rights, whether it is the constitution 
or a federal statute. This is because section 1983 does not provide 
any substantive rights but serves only as a conduit or cause of action 
for enforcing substantive rights.47 
Analytically, it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court charac­
terized that as an exception because a ruling that plaintiff does 
not have enforceable rights under a federal statute is a ruling on the 
merits, and the case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim,48 
rather than on the grounds that section 1983 cannot be utilized to 
enforce a statute which establishes no substantive rights in the plain­
tiff. This is comparable to the situation in which plaintiff states a 
cause of action under section 1983 to enforce the fourteenth amend­
ment but the court decides there has been no violation of the four­
teenth amendment. Such a plaintiff has stated a claim under section 
1983 but simply loses on the merits.49 
43. The Coun specifically held in Thibou!o! that section 1988 covers statutory as 
well as' constitutional claims. 448 U.S. at 9. 
44. 451 U.S. I. 28 (1981) (section 1983 may not provide a cause of action in all 
situations where a plaintiff attempts to enforce federal statutory rights). 
45. 453 U.S. I (1981). 
46. Id at 19: The question was addressed by the Coun even though the plaintiffs 
did not assen a section 1983 claim. Id 
47. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org .. 441 U.S. 600,617-18 (1979). Simi­
larly. section 1985(3) does not provide substantive rights but serves only as a vehicle for 
enforcing other rights. Great American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny. 442 U.S. 366, 372 
( 1979). 
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
49. See. e.g .. Dandridge v. Williams, 347 U.S. 471 (1970). 
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The first Pennhurst exception mentioned in National Sea Clam­
mers ,50 where Congress forclosed private enforcement of section 
1983 in the enactment itself, is very troublesome. Rarely, if ever, 
does Congress expressly indicate that section 1983 cannot be invoked 
to enforce a particular statute. Like the cases raising the question 
whether a right of action or certain remedies should be implied 
under federal statutes,51 this exception requires the courts to attempt 
to ascertain congressional intent in an area where there is little infor­
mation that can be of assistance. 
Not surprisingly, a substantial amount of time is consumed liti­
gating the preliminary question of whether a right of action and cer­
tain remedies should be implied under federal statutes. 52 The Court 
has suggested that "[w]hen Congress intends private litigants to have 
a cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far better 
course is for it to specify as much when it creates those rightS."53 
Few would dispute that it would be "far better" if Congress did ex­
pressly address remedies when it creates rights; however, it is unreal­
istic to expect such clarity from Congress in what is often very 
controversial legislation. Efforts to set out the technicalities and de­
tails of enforcement in every piece of legislation considered by Con­
gress could lead to endless debates and stall or prevent the passage of 
important legislation. While deploring the amount of time spent on 
the implied right of action issue, the Court in National Sea Clam­
mers has needlessly required the lower courts to undertake the same 
time-consuming inquiry with respect to each federal statute which 
plaintiffs attempt to enforce through section 1983.54 
In both of these situations the inquiry into congressional intent 
50. 453 U.S. at 19. 
51. For a recent Supreme Court decision addressing the implied right issue, see 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982). In Cort v. Ash, 
422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court established four criteria for determining whether to imply a 
private right of action. Id at 78. Subsequent decisions, however, have made it clear that 
the focus is on the intent of Congress. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 
102 S. Ct. at 1839. See also id at 1839 n.60. 
52. An indication of the amount of time spent on this question is given by Justice 
Powell: "My research ... indicates that in the past decade there have been at least 243 
reported circuit court opinions and 515 district court opinions dealing with the existence 
of implied causes of action under various federal statutes." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen­
ner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1855 n.17 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
53. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). The clarity sought 
by the Court may not be possible given the nature of the legislative process. Steinberg, 
Implied Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33, 41 (1979); 
Wartelle & Louden, Private Enforcement ofFederal Statutes: The Role ojthe Section 1983 
Remedy, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 536-37 (1982). 
54. 453 U.S. at 19-21. 
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could easily be avoided. Several years ago in Bell v. Hood,55 the 
Court stated: 
[W]hen federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been 
the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their 
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well 
settled that where legal rights have been invaded and the federal 
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, fed­
eral courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong 
done. 56 
Strict application of Bell would make it clear to Congress that the 
courts will assume that Congress intends a remedy where it creates a 
right and further assume that Congress intends the courts to exercise 
the full range of their remedial powers unless expressly restricted by 
Congress. Instead of requiring Congress to address enforcement and 
remedy in each piece of legislation, Congress would have to face 
these questions only when it wants to change the general rule, that is, . 
where there is a right there is a remedy. 
Similarly, it should be assumed, as suggested in Thipoutot, that 
section 1983 means what it says and all federal statutes can be en­
forced through section 1983 unless Congress expressly indicates to 
the contrary. This is consistent with the test established in Car/son l'. 
Green 57 for suits under the Constitution: The defendant must 
demonstrate that Congress has provided an alternative, equally ef­
fective remedy that was explicitly intended to substitute for recovery 
directly under the Constitution. 58 Yet the Supreme Court in Pen­
nhurst and National Sea C/ammers has decided to ignore the plain 
language of section 1983 and impose a needless obligation on the 
lower courts each time a plaintiff seeks to enforce a federal statute 
through section 1983. 
Under Supreme Court decisions, not only do the lower courts 
have to attempt to determine whether Congress intended a private 
right of action, but where the answer is affirmative, they must then 
determine which remedies Congress intended. This bifurcaied in­
quiry is demonstrated by the decision in Transamerica Mortgage Ad­
visors, Inc., v. Lewis.59 After finding an implied right of action under 
55. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
56. fd at 684 (footnotes omitted); see also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 
396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). 
57. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
58. fd at 18-19; see also, Note, Preclusion 0/Section /983 Causes 0/Action by Com­
prehensive Statutory Remedial Schemes, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1183 (1982). 
59. 444 U.S. II (1979). 
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the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,60 the Court concluded that it is 
limited to equitable relief.6t 
An example more analogous to the attorney fee situation is 
found in Lieberman v. University of Chicago .62 There, the court 
raised the question of whether damages are available under title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972.63 The question arose after 
the Supreme Court held in Cannon v. University of Chicago 64 that 
there is an implied right of action under title IX.65 Relying on its 
own conclusion that title IX was passed pursuant to the spending 
power of Congress, the court in Lieberman adopted the Pennhursl 
guidelines66 "for construing implied rights and remedies in the con­
text of funding legislation."67 
Applying the contract analysis of Pennhurst, the Lieberman 
court agreed with the lower court finding that damages are not avail­
able under title IX.68 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that absent ex­
press congressional language establishing a damage remedy, the 
schools could not possibly be agreeing to damage actions in their 
acceptance of the federal funds which trigger the application of title 
60. 15 U.S.c. §§ 80b-I-80b-21 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
61. 444 U.S. at 19-24. 
62. 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981), cerr. denied, \02 S. Ct. 1993-94 (1982). 
63. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1681-1686 (1976). 
64. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
65. Id at 717. 
66. The Pennhursl guidelines can be summarized as follows: 
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a 
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally 
imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the 
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly ac­
cepts the terms of the "contract". . . . There can, of course. be no knowing 
acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what 
is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the 
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. . . . By insisting that 
Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice 
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation. 
451 U.S. at 17 (citations omitted). Remedies for violations of funding conditions are 
discussed generally in Note, Injunclive Relief From Slale Violalions of Federal Funding 
Condilions, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1236 (1982). 
67. 660 F.2d at 1187. Even if title IX was passed under the spending power. its 
reach "is at least as broad as the regulatory powers of Congress." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980). One of the regulatory powers is provided by section 5 of the 
fourteenth amendment which certainly gives Congress the power to prohibit sex discrim­
ination in education, even absent federal funds. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. If Con­
gress could have achieved its objective under section 5, then Fullilove suggests that 
Congress' acting under the spending power is not a limitation on the scope of the legisla­
tion. 448 U.S. at 475-78. 
68. 660 F .2d at 1187-88. 
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IX.69 Because the court characterized title IX as part of a bill 
designed to assist educational institutions in "accute financial dis­
tress," it concluded that Congress did not intend to subject such in­
stitutions to "potentially massive financial liability" that might 
exceed the federal funds. 70 In essence, the court suggested that Con­
gress could not have intended to impose additional financial burdens 
on schools accepting the federal funds when the purpose of the Act 
was to relieve some of the financial burdens. 
One of the leading cases addressing the question whether a 
plaintiff prevailing under the EAHCA can recover compensatory 
damages and attorney fees also arose in the Seventh Circuit. In An­
derson v. Thompson,71 the court held that section 615(e) of the 
EAHCA,n which provides district courts with the power to "grant 
such relief as the court determines is appropriate,"73 does not pro­
vide for damages unless exceptional circumstances exist.74 An un­
limited. damage remedy was found to be inconsistent with the 
legislative intent in passing the EAHCA.7S Two exceptional circum­
stances were recognized: First, where parents make alternate ar­
rangements to those offered by the school system in order to avoid a 
serious risk of injury to the child's physical health; and second, 
where the school system acts in bad faith in failing to make available 
the procedural protections of the EAHCA which could result in an 
appropriate placement.76 In so holding, the Anderson court has sug­
gested that parents should be allowed to recoup the cost c,f the alter­
native arrangements. 77 
.Because the plaintiffs in Anderson sought attorney fees under 
section 1988, the court had to address the question of whether sec­
tion 1983 could be used as a conduit to attorney fees under section 
69. ld 
70. ld Even if one accepts the Pennhursl contract analysis for purposes of deter­
mining whether funding legislation provides rights, 451 U.S. at 47-51,53-55 (White, J., 
dissenting), it is not clear that this analysis supports the exclusion of damages under 
statutes such as title IX which do create such rights. Entities which accept federal funds 
should be aware that damages can be assessed for breach of the "contract." 
71. 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981). 
72. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(e) (1976). 
73. ld 
74. 658 F.2d at 1209-14. 
75. ld 
76. ld at !213-14. 
77. ld For cases relying on Anderson, but finding that exceptional circumstances 
have not been demonstrated, see Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 811-12 (1st Cir. 1982); 
Mark R. v. Board of Educ., 546 F. Supp. \027, 1030-32 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
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1988.78 This, of course, required a determination of whether section 
1983 can be used to enforce the EAHCA.79 Relying on Pennhurst, 
the Anderson court stated that "despite Thiboutot, section 1983 is not 
applicable in situations 'where the governing statute provides an ex­
clusive remedy for violations of the Act.' "80 The EAHCA does not 
expressly indicate that it provides an exclusive remedy. To deter­
mine whether the statutory remedy under the EAHCA was intended 
to be exclusive, the Anderson court looked to Brown v. General Serv­
ices Administration 8) and Great American Federal Savings and Loans 
Association v. Novotny.82 These cases direct the courts to an exami­
nation of the legislative history and the structure of the statute to 
determine whether Congress intended it to be exclusive. As with the 
implied right of action inquiry,83 the courts are left to struggle with 
the question of congressional intent in situations where there is fre­
quently no indication of that intent. 84 
Addressing the EAHCA, the court in Anderson indicated that 
the statute, "like the statutes at issue in Brown and Novotlij', contains 
an elaborate administrative and judicial enforcement system."85 
Next, the court indicated that "Congress when enacting the EAHCA 
also believed that the rights it was creating had heretofore been inad­
equately protected under federal law."86 This reason is somewhat 
suspect. Clearly, the EAHCA was a recognition that the rights of 
children with handicaps were not being adequately protected by the 
states and local schools. But certainly Congress was not suggesting 
78. The court summarily concluded that the "EAHCA does not itself provide for 
attorney's fees." 658 F.2d at 1217. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text. 
79. 658 F.2d at 1214-15. While the Seventh Circuit addressed the availability of 
section 1983 in order to determine whether fees could be awarded under section 1988, if 
section 1983 is available to enforce the EAHCA, then a plaintiff should be able to seek 
damages under section 1983 even if the EAHCA itself does not provide for such dam­
ages. It could be argued that section 1983 is available, but only to the extent that it is not 
inconsistent with the EAHCA. But see Calhoun v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 550 F. 
Supp. 796 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Thus, if a court finds that damages are not available under 
the EAHCA, it then would not allow them under section 1983. 
80. ld. at 1215 (citations omitted). 
81. 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (section 717 of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
provides the exclusive judicial remedy for employment discrimination claims brought by 
federal employees). 
82. 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (42 U.S.c. § 1985(3) (Supp. IV 1980) creates no substantive 
rights and therefore cannot be utilized to enforce the provisions of title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964). 
83. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra notes 51-70 and accompanying text. While the task is similar, it will 
be suggested that the test is different. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text. 
85. 658 F.2d at 1216. 
86. Id. 
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that the right of children with handicaps to an equal educational 
opportunity had not been established. To the contrary, the legisla­
tive history of the EAHCA makes it apparent that Congress was act­
ing to assist the states in complying with the court decisions 
establishing the right of children with handicaps to an equal educa­
tional opportunity under the fourteenth amendment. 87 
Finally, the court found the most compelling reason for its con­
clusion that the EAHCA provides the exclusive remedy to be "that 
the relief it provides is inconsistent with section 1983 relief."88 Ac­
cording to the court, the two are inconsistent because section 1983 
provides for damages whereas the court had already concluded that 
the EAHCA does not provide for damages absent exceptional cir­
cumstances. In summary the court stated: 
[T]he availability of a private right of action under the EAHCA, 
the detailed statutory administrative and judicial scheme, the fact 
that Congress intended the EAHCA to create new rights, and the 
absence of a traditional damage remedy, together compel our con­
clusion that the judicial remedy provided in the EAHCA was in­
tended to be exclusive.89 
There are several grounds on which to challenge the result 
reached in Anderson. First, the legislative history does not support 
the conclusion that "Congress intended the EAHCA to create new 
rights."90 To the contrary, Congress passed the EAHCA primarily 
to provide financial assistance to the states to help them comply with 
existing constitutional rights as found by several decisions.91 While 
the EAHCA created new rights in the sense that it made financial 
assistance available and provided a federal statutory basis for the 
right to an equal educational opportunity, Congress clearly recog­
nized that this right already existed under the fourteenth 
amendment.92 
Second, the fact that the statute establishes a "detailed statutory 
administrative and judicial scheme"93 in no way implies that Con­
87. See, e.g." S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, 13. 17.22-24, reprinted in 
1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1425, 1429·31, 1437, 1440-41, 1446-48 (hereinafter 
cited as S. REP. No. 168); H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 10, 19 (hereinafter 
cited as H.R. REP. No. 332). 
88. 658 F.2d at 1216. 
89. Id at 1217. 
90. Id 
91. See supra note 87. 
92. Id 
93. 658 F.2d at 1217. 
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gress intended to exclude section 1983 actions. It is just as logical to 
conclude that Congress established this scheme because it wanted to 
ensure that the states set up an administrativ~ enforcement mecha­
nism to eliminate the necessity for every aggrieved person to file a 
lawsuit.94 Administrative proceedings are generally more accessible 
to parents and children, particularly those who cannot afford the 
services of an attorney. Certainly the fact that a federal statute man­
dates a state administrative procedure in no way suggests that sec­
tion 1983 should not be available. Nothing in the legislative history 
of the EAHCA suggests that Congress intended to preclude section 
1983 actions. Every indication is that Congress was attempting to 
increase enforcement of the rights of children with handicaps. This 
is made clear in the Senate Committee report: . 
The Committee wishes to clarify, however, that it does not intend 
the existence of such an entity [for insuring compliance in the 
states] to limit the right of individuals to seek redress of grievances 
through other avenues, such as bringing civil action in Federal or 
State courts to protect and enforce the rights of handicapped chil­
dren under applicable law.95 
The existence of a state administrative procedure was not deter­
minative in Thiboulol. The Social Security Act expressly requires 
the states to make an administrative hearing process available to re­
cipients who wish to contest agency action.96 The EAHCA differs 
from the Social Security Act in that the former provides for judicial 
review of the agency decision in either federal or state court. In con­
trast, the Social Security Act is silent on this topic. Judicial review of 
the agency decision, however, is available in most states under an 
administrative procedure act. Therefore, the only real difference be­
tween the EAHCA and the Social Security Act is that the former 
provides for judicial review of the state administrative proceedings 
94. This was recognized by the Senate Committee: 

It should not, however, be necessary for parents throughout the country to con­

tinue utilizing the couns to assure themselves a remedy. It is this Committee's 

belief that the Congress must take a more active role under its responsibility for 

equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped children are pro­

vided equal educational opponunity. It can no longer be the policy of the Gov­

ernment to merely establish an unenforceable goal requiring all children to be 

in school. S. 6 takes positive necessary steps to ensure that the rights of c~ldren 
and their families are protected. 
S. REP. No. 168, supra note 87, at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
1433. 
95. fd. at 26. reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1450. 
96. See 42 U.S.c. § 602(a)(4) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1982). 
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in a federal court, as well as a state court. The judicial remedy pro­
vided by section 615(e)(2) of the EAHCA is clearly in the nature of 
judicial review rather than an original action.97 It seems rather tenu­
ous to conclude that Congress, simply by making judicial review of 
the state agency proceedings available in federal court as well as 
state court, intended to preclude section 1983 actions to enforce the 
EAHCA when such actions are available to enforce the Social Secur­
ity Act. 
There is evidence in the legislative history that Congress ex­
pressly provided a judicial remedy in section 6l5(e)(2) of the 
EAHCA not because it wanted to preclude an action under section 
1983, but rather because it wanted to assure that judicial review of 
state agency action could be obtained in a federal court. The House 
Committee expressed concern about the lack of enforcement in the 
states even though most of them make education for children with 
handicaps mandatory.98 Absent the provision in section 615(e)(2), 
such federal court review of state agency action would not have been 
possible.99 Further, by limiting the judicial proceeding- to review of 
agency action, it is less likely that Congress even considered the rem­
edy question because compensatory damages are n-ormally not avail­
able in state administrative proceedings. loo This being true, there 
would be no reason to submit evidence relating to damages to the 
administrative hearing officer and, therefore, the record -being re­
viewed by the court would not include evidence relating to damages. 
In federal court the seventh amendment to the United States Consti­
tution assures a jury trial in actions seeking compensatory dam­
97. 	 Specifically. the statute slates: 
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decisions made [by the state edu­
cational agency) ... shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to 
the complaint presented pursuant to this section. which action may be brought 
in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United, 
States without regard to the amount in controversy. In any action brought 
under this paragraph. the court shall receive the records of the administrative 
proceedings. shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, bas­
ing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as 
the court determines is appropriate. 
20 U.S.c. § l4IS(e)(2) (1976). 
98. H. REP. No. 332, supra note 87, at 10 (legislation without "meaningful provi­
sions for actual enforcement, has proven to be of limited value"). 
99. De novo actions under section 1983 would have been available to enforce the 
EAHCA but Congress was seeking to improve nonjudicial enforcement and the availa­
bility of judicial review 'tends to improve agency proceedings. 
100. The EAHCA provision mandating the administrative procedures does not ad­
dress the remedy question. See 20 U.S.c. § 141S (1976). 
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ages. 101 While section 615(e)(2) allows the court to "hear additional 
evidence at the request of a party," there is no evidence that Con­
gress intended jury trials under section 615(e)(2). Quite simply, re­
quiring a state administrative remedy and providing for judicial 
review of the agency proceedings in no way suggests that Congress 
intended to preclude section 1983 actions for damages. 
The policy reasons advanced in Anderson, supporting the con­
clusion that damages are not available under the EAHCA,102 are not 
convincing for a number of reasons. First, the concerns expressed 
are partially served by the doctrine of qualified immunity, which ap­
plies in section 1983 actions seeking damages from school officials 
for violations of the EAHCA. 103 Difficulty in diagnosing children 
with handicaps and uncertainty about some of the handicapping 
conditions lO4 may provide a basis for a qualified immunity defense. 
As expressed by the Supreme Court in its most recent decision on 
this topic, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,lOs "[w]e therefore hold that govern­
ment officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known."I06 The determi­
nation of whether clearly established rights were violated can usually 
be made on a motion for summary judgment. 107 Therefore, school 
officials making a "good faith effort to provide a child with an ap­
propriate education ..."108 would not be "exposing themselves to 
monetary liability for incorrect placements ...."109 
School corporations or entities, however, are not protected by 
this immunity.IIO It is, however, not at all clear why school corpora­
tions should be insulated from damages when they violate the rights 
of children with handicaps under the EAHCA. Concern about the 
IO\. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 
369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
102. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
103. Qualified immunity protects public officials who act in good faith. See, e.g., 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); Supreme Court v. Consumers Union of the 
United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
104. 658 F.2d at 1212. 
105. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982). 
106. Id. at 2738 .. 
107. Id. at 2737-39. 
108. 658 F.2d at 1213. 
109. Id. 
110. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635-38 (1980). 
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school system's lack of available funds for education III could insu­
late the schools from any damage action, not just those under the 
EAHCA. .. This is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's decision 
in Owen v. City ofIndependence, 112 which holds that municipal enti­
ties are responsible for damages caused by actions of officials taken 
pursuant to the policy of the municipality.113 Because respondeat 
superior liability is not available, school corporations would be lia­
ble only where the violations are caused by official policy.1l4 
Another argument supporting a damage award for violations of 
the EAHCA flows from the language of section 6IS(e)(2) itself. It 
states that the court "shall grant such relief as [it] determines is ap­
propriate."IIS On its face, this would seem to allow any relief, in­
cluding damages. The court in Anderson, however, concluded that 
the term "appropriate," when viewed in its context in section 
61S(e)(2), "was generally intended to be restricted to injunctive re­
lief...." 116 In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied on the 
failure to demonstrate a co.ngressional intent to create a damage 
remedy. 117 
The problem with this analysis is that it requires plaintiff to 
demonstrate evidence of a congressional intent to provide for dam­
ages, whereas under National Sea Clammers, the test should be 
whether the defendant can demonstrate that Congress intended to 
preclude damages under section 1983. 118 The court in Anderson ad­
mits that the "legislative history of the [EAHCA] is silent on the 
question of whether a damage remedy was intended." 119 This being 
the case, it must be presumed that section 1983 and the remedies it 
provides are available. 
In National Sea Clammers, the Court was looking for factors 
tending "to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy 
of suits under § 1983."120 Although the Court did not require an 
express indication of congressional intent, it did require a showing of 
such an intent rather than simply the absence of an intention to 
III. 658 F.2d at 1212-13. 
112. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). 
113. Id at 644-50. 
114. Id at 655 n.39; see also Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658. 
690-95 (1978) .. 
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). 
116. 658 F.2d at 1211. 
117. Id at 1211-12. 
118. 453 U.S. at 20. 
119. 658 F.2d at 1211. 
120. 453 U.S. at 20. 
408 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:391 
make damages available. 121 Justice Stevens, in dissent, suggested 
that the Court improperly placed the burden on the section 1983 
plaintiff. After stating that "the question is not whether Congress 
'intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action,' but rather whether 
Congress intended to withdraw that right of action,"122 Justice Ste­
vens indicated that the dispute involved more than semantics. 123 
Justice Stevens is correct in this assertion. The proper applica­
tion of National Sea Clammers is demonstrated by the decision in 
Ryans v. New Jersey Commission for the Blind,124 where the court 
compared the inquiry under National Sea Clammers to that involved 
in determining the existence of an implied private right of action. 125 
121. ld. at 27 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
122. ld. at 27. 
123. Specifically, Justice Stevens stated: 
As the Court formulates the inquiry, the burden is placed on the § 1983 plaintiff 
to show an explicit or implicit congressional intention that violations of the 
substantive statute at issue be redressed in private § 1983 actions. The correct 
formulation. however, places the burden on the defendant to show that Con­
gress intended to foreclose access to the § 1983 remedy as a means of enforcing 
the substantive statute. Because the § 1983 plaintiff is invoking an express pri­
vate remedy that is, on its face, applicable any time a violation of a federal 
statute is alleged,. . . the burden is properly placed on the defendant to show 
that Congress, in enacting the particular substantive statute at issue, intended 
an exception to the general rule of § 1983. A defendant may carry this burden 
by identifying express statutory language or legi~lative history revealing Con­
gress' intent to foreclose the § 1983 remedy, or by establishing that Congress 
intended that the remedies provided in the substantive statute itself be 
exclusive. 
ld. at 27 n.11 (citation omitted). The majority, in responding to Justice Stevens, indi­
cated that it does "not suggest that the burden is on a plaintiff to demonstrate congres­
sional.intent to preserve § 1983 remedies." ld. at 21 n.31; see also Wartelle & Louden, 
supra note 53, at 540-42; Comment, Section 198] and Ihe Privale Enforcemem o/Federal 
Stalules: A New Fromier for the Civil War Legislation, 18 WILLAMEITE L.J. 433,461-66 
(1982). 
124. 542 F. Supp. 841, 846-49 (D.N.J. 1982). 
125. ld. at 848. In addressing the issue of private rights of action, the court in 
Ryans stated: 
A court will not presume to find a private right of action in a statute silent as to 
remedy unless there is some evidence to indicate that the legislature impliedly 
intended one to exist. In determiiling the exclusivity question, on the other 
hand, the court must presume a § 1983 right of action to exist unless there is 
evidence in the underlying statute which suggests an intent on the part of Con­
gress to foreclose such an action. It is quite possible to find in the same statute, 
therefore, the absence of any intention on the part of Congress to either create 
an implied right of action or to preclude the assertion of a § 1983 action. In 
such a case, as in ThiboUIOI. an individual aggrieved under the terms of the 
statute would be entitled to bring a § 1983 action against state officials but not 
private parties. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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In so doing, the court concluded that title I of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 126 does not provide an implied right of action 127 but can be 
enforced through section 1983 after exhaustion of the administrative 
remedies provided by the Act. 128 
The reasoning and analysis of Ryans is more important than its 
result. 129 The holding was less difficult than cases involving the 
EAHCA because title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, while re­
quiring state administrative procedures, contains no judicial reme­
dies. Thus, the Ryans court found the situation more analogous to 
Thiboutot than National Sea Clammers .130 
In order to determine whether it would be inconsistent with the 
EAHCA to allow enforcement actions pursuant to section 1983, it is 
necessary to address the practical ramifications of allowing such ac­
tions. First, since section 1983 provides for damages, it would allow 
an additional remedy which Anderson held was available directly 
under the EAHCA only in two exceptional circumstances. 13I Al­
though damages would be available under section 1983, school offi­
cials could raise qualified immunity as all affirmative defense.132 
Injunctive relief is also available under section 1983, but this is avail­
able directly under the EAHCA as well. Finally, section 1983 would 
make it possible for prevailing plaintiffs to seek attorney fees under 
section 1988. It can be demonstrated that the availability of section 
1983 is not at all inconsistent with the EAHCA. . 
In a case in which a child with handicaps challenges the ade­
quacy of the educational opportunity made available, the first step 
126. 29 U.S.c. §§ 720-750 (1976 & Supp. v 1981). 
127. 542 F. Supp. at 846: see also Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs .• 
504 F. Supp. 1244, 1248-51 (N.D. Ill. 1981), affd in part. rev'd and remanded in part. 689 
F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff obtained all the relief sought under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, thus the coun did not decide whether title I could be en­
forced through section 1983). 
128. The recent holding of the Supreme Coun in Patsy v. Board of Regents. 102 S. 
Ct. 2557 (1982), that a section 1983 plaintiff does not have to exhaust state administrative 
remedies absent a congressional intent to require such exhaustion, id. at 2566, was distin­
guished by the Ryans coun because Congress had made "express provision for a state 
administrative scheme, [andJ its intent to require exhaustion of that scheme may readily 
be inferred." 542 F. Supp. at 850 n.13. 
129. Similar approaches are suggested in Wanelie & Louden, supra note 46, at 
540-42: Comment, supra note 123. at 457-66; Note, supra note 58, at 1199-1205. 
130. 542 F. Supp. at 848-49. 
131. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
132. Gomez v. Toledo. 446 U.S. 635. 641 (1980). The school board and the munic­
ipal corporation or entity can be sued under section 1983, Monell v. Depanment of So­
cial Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but it does not enjoy a qualified immunity for the 
wrongful conduct of its officers. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 662 (1980). 
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would normally be the administrative proceedings mandated by sec­
tion 615 of the EAHCA.133 Exhaustion of these remedies would not 
be required where it would be futile or where the administrative 
remedy would be inadequate. 134 Assuming that the matter is not sat­
isfactorily resolved at the administrative level, the child with handi­
cap could seek judicial review in federal court pursuant to section 
615(e)(2). Under Anderson, relief based on this claim would nor­
mally be limited to injunctive relief. 135 
. The child with handicaps could also assert a claim under section 
1983, alleging violations of the EAHCAI36 and seeking not only in­
junctive relief, but also compensatory damages and attorney fees. 
The court could conduct a bifurcated proceeding. If plaintiff seeks 
relief in the nature of a preliminary injunction, the judicial review 
portion of the case could be decided promptly, with or without addi­
tional evidence, and the section 1983 claim for damages could subse­
quently be submitted to a jury. In the latter aspect of the case, the 
school officials could, or course, assert a qualified immunity defense. 
The congressional purposes in mandating the state administrative 
proceedings through section 615 of the EAHCA would be satisfied 
by plaintiff's filing of an administrative complaint before proceeding 
in federal court. 13? If plaintiff prevails in the administrative pro­
ceedings, injunctive relief would no longer be necessary but the 
plaintiff may still bring a section 1983 action seeking compensatory 
damages for violation of rights secured by the EAHCA. 
The courts are divided on the question of whether section 1983 
is available to enforce the EAHCA.138 Several of the decisions hold­
133. McGovern v. Sullins, 676 F.2d 98, 99 (4th Cir. 1982); Scruggs v. Campbell, 
630 F.2d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 1980); Mitchell v. Walter, 538F. Supp. 1111,1112-14 (S.D. 
Ohio 1982); H.R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. 215, 221 (D. Md. 1981) .. 
134. See, e.g., Monahan v. Nebraska, 645 F.2d 592, 597 (8th Cir. 1981); Doe v. 
Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 228 (N.D. Ind. 1979). 
135. 658 F.2d at 1210. 
136. It would normally be advantageous for the plaintiff to assen claims under the 
founeenth amendment and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as well. 
137. This was suggested by the coun in Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 984 
(N.D. Tex. 1981), but was rejected by the Anderson coun. 658 F.2d at 1216 n.16. See 
also Ryans v. New Jersey Comm'n for the Blind, 542 F. Supp .. at 849-52; H.R. v. 
Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. 215,222-23 (D. Md. 1981). 
138. Compare Roben M. v. Benton, 671 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1982); Jose P. v. 
Ambach, 669 F.2d 865,869-71 (2d Cir. 1982); Depanment of Educ. v. Katherine D., 531 
F. Supp. 517, 531 (D. Hawaii 1982); Mattie T. v. Holladay, 522 F. Supp. 72, 74 (N.D. 
Miss. 1981); Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 983-84 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (section 1983 is 
available to enforce the EAHCA) Wlih McGovern v. Sullins, 676 F.2d 98, 99 (4th Cir. 
1982); Calhoun v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Noe v. 
Ambach, 542 F. Supp. 70, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375. 
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ing that section 1983 is not available rely onAnderson. 139 Those de­
cisions not citing Anderson do not advance any new arguments. A 
question not answered by Anderson is whether a plaintiff can use 
section 1983 to enforce rights under the EAHCA when a state re­
fuses to provide the administrative remedy mandated under section 
615 of the EAHCA. 
That issue is currently pending before the Seventh Circuit in 
J)oe v. Koger .140 In Koger, the district court found that defendants 
violated the EAHCA by expelling a child with handicaps in accord­
ance with normal disciplinary procedures "without first determining, 
by [EAHCA] procedures, whether his propensity to disrupt was the 
result of his inappropriate placement." 141 The court did not indicate 
whether it was enforcing the EAHCA through section 615(e)(2) or 
through section 1983. It subsequently denied, however, the plain­
tiffs request for fees under section 1988 on the basis of Anderson .142 
Because the judicial proceedings authorized by section 615(e)(2) 
are in the nature of judicial review of the state agency's determina­
tion and because defendants in Koger refused to utilize the adminis­
trative procedures mandated by section 615, it is not clear that a 
plaintiff who seeks an injunction requiring the state to conduct pro­
. ceedings under section 615 to determine the relationship between the 
disruptive behavior and the handicap can proceed under section 
615(e)(2).143 Assuming that the answer is negative, such a plaintiff 
would be without a judicial remedy for a clear violation of the 
1389 n.20 (D.R.I. 1982); Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 580-81 (D.R.I. 1982); Ruth 
Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 473-75 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Akers 
v. Bolten, 531 F. Supp. 300, 316 (D. Kan. 1981) (section 1983 is not available). The 
question was recently avoided in Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 975-77 (8th Cir. 
1982). See generally Note, A ConfUSion of Rights and Remedies: Tatro v. Texas, 14 
CONN. L. REV. 585, 593-96 (1982). 
139. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 550 F. Supp.796 (N.D. Ill. 
1982); Davis v. Maine Endwell Cent. School Dist., 542 F. Supp. 1257, 1261-62 (N.D.N.Y. 
1982); Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 468, 473-75 (S.D. 
Tex. 1982); Akers v. Bolton, 531 F. Supp. 300, 316 (D. Kan. 1981). 
140. 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979). appeal docketed, No. 82-1805 (7th Cir. 
May 19, 1982). The author is the attorney of record on appeal. 
141. Jd at 229; see also Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982): S-1 v. 
Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.), cerr. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981): Stuan v. Nappi. 
443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978). 
142. See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text. 
143. It may be that this is a situation where exhaustion is not required because it 
would be futile or there is not an adequate administrative remedy. See supra note 134 
and accompanying text. The state. however. may have a suitable administrative process 
but contends that school disciplinary proceedings are not covered by section 615 of the 
EAHCA. For a discussion of disciplinary exclusions under the EAHC A. see Note. Disci· 
plinary Exclusion of Handicapped Students: An Examination of the Limitations Imposed 
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EAHCA unless section 1983 is available. States could avoid en­
forcement of the EAHCA by simply refusing to establish the admin­
istrative procedures mandated by section 615. 
At least one court of appeals has suggested that section 1983 is 
available to enforce the EAHCA in this situation. In Hymes v. Har­
nell County Board ofEducation, 144 the court awarded fees under sec­
tion 1983 because "no judicial relief route is provided in the 
EAHCA, to prevent an alteration in the educational placement of a 
child, pending administrative determination (and any appeal there­
from to the courtS)."145 The situation in Hymes is very similar to 
Koger in that the litigation sought "to obtain restoration to the regu­
lar school program" 146 pending the outcome of administrative 
proceedings. 
Concerning the applicability of section 615(e)(2), the court in 
Hymes stated that the EAHCA provides no jurisdictional basis for a 
suit to enforce the right to remain in status quo prior to the comple­
tion of the administrative process. 147 The court reemphasized that 
section 615(e)(2) limits the jurisdictional provisions of EAHCA to 
actions of any party aggrieved by the findings and decisions in an 
administrative hearing conducted by the state or local educational 
by the Education/or All Handicapped Children Act of1975,51 FORDHAM L. REV. 168 
(1982). 
144. 664 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1981). 
145. fd. at 413. See also Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In 
Tatro, the court concluded that a section 1983 action was available as long as the plaintiff 
had exhausted administrative remedies under section 615(e). The court stated that 
"[w]hatever may be the role of § 1983 where the attack is upon the adequacy of proce­
dures themselves, this court sees no role for § 1983 here." fd. at 984. 
146. 664 F.2d at 411. 
147. 	 Specifically, the court in Hymes stated: 
If the current educational placement at that time had remained the normal 
classroom program, EAHCA appears to mandate that the child should have 
been allowed to remain in the program pending the outcome of state or local 
administrative proceedings. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(e)(3). Yet the EAHCA provides 
no jurisdictional basis for a suit to enforce the right to remain in statu quo [sic] 
. prior to completion of the administrative process. 20 U.S.c. § l4l5(e)(2) limits 
the jurisdictional provisions of EAHCA to actions of any party aggrieved by the 
findings and decision in an administrative hearing conducted by the state or 
local educational agency. Obviously, no such findings and decision were extant 
at the time the reinstatement relief was sought in federal court and gained 
through a negotiated settlement between the parties. 
Here, in fact, the child had already been removed from the normal class­
room program placement. In that stance, he had, under EAHCA, even less 
access to any jurisdiction of the federal court. 
fd. at 412 n.2. 
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agency.14!< Under this rationale, section 1983 should be available to 
enforce the EAHCA in some circumstances even if the Anderson de­
cision is correct in holding that section 1983 is generally not 
available. 
Courts have been struggling with the application of Pennhurst 
and National Sea Clammers in cases involving plaintiffs' attempts to 
use section 1983 to enforce federal statutes other than those relating 
to the educational rights of children with handicaps. Most decisions 
have avoided the more difficult question by concluding that the 
plaintiff either has no rights under the substantive federal statute or 
did not state a violation of the statute. 149 Other courts have consid­
ered the comprehensiveness of the remedy and the inconsistency 
with the federal substantive statute to preclude the use of section 
1983 to enforce a federal statute. 150 Another court summarily con­
cluded, relying on Th,boutotand Cuyler v. Adams,'51 that a plaintiff 
could use section 1983 to enforce the Interstate Agreement on De­
tainers. 152 These cases provide little help in deciding the issue dis­
cussed here; rather, they simply confirm the uncertainty which was 
unnecessarily created by the decisions in Pennhurst and National Sea 
Clammers. 
A second argument in favor of an award of attorney fees under 
148. Id 
,149. See. e.g.. Local Div. 732. Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan At­
lanta Rapid Transit Auth., 667 F.2d 1327, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 1982) (no violation of the 
Urban Mass Transponation Act); Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (4th 
CiT. 1981) (various sections of the Housing Act do nOl create legally cognizable rights in 
tenants): Brown v. Sibley. 650 F.2d 760, 764-65 (5th Cir. 1981) (no allegation or showing 
of a violation of section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973): Lloyd v. lIlinois Regional 
Transp. Auth .. 548 F. Supp. 575, 587 (N.D. 111. 1982) (Urban Mass Transponation Act): 
Thompson v. Binghamton Hous. Auth .. 546 F. Supp. 1158, 1180-83 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(Housing Act creates no substantive rights); Weems v. Pierce, 534 F. Supp. 740, 744-45 
(D. 111. 1982) (relying on Perry v. Housing Auth.); see also Operating Engineers Local 3 
v. Bo~. 541 F. Supp. 486, 491-93 (D. Utah 1982) (coun recognized the issues but did not 
decide whether the Davis-Bacon Act can be enforced through section 1983). 
150. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New York, 676 F.2d 20, 22-23 (2d CiT. 
1982) (Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA) provides exclu­
sive remedy): Amoco Oil Co. v. Local 99, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work­
ers. 536 F. Supp. 1203, 1217-18 (D.R.1. 1982) (same reasoning utilized to preclude use of 
42 U.s.c. § 1985(3) (Supp. IV 1980) to enforce the National Labor Relations Act); 
Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 1161. 1176-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Congress. in pass­
ing Urban Mass Transponation Act, did not intend to create rights enforceable through 
section 1983). affd in pari, rev'd in pari, 687 F.2d 644 (2d CiT. 1982). 
151. 449 U.S. 433 (1981). 
152. Bush v. Muncy. 659 F.2d 402. 406 (4th Cir. 1981): if. McGhee v. Housing 
Auth.. 543 F. Supp. 607. 608-10 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (although there is no implied right of 
action under the Brooke Amendment. 42 U.S.c. § 1437a (West Supp. 1982). it can be 
enforced through section 1983). 
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the EAHCA relies on the following language of section 6l5(e)(2): 
"[i]n any action brought under this paragraph the court shall . . . 
grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 153 As noted 
earlier, the court in Anderson concluded that this language does not 
generally authorize a damage remedy. 154 The court also concluded, 
very summarily, that the "EAHCA does not itself provide for attor­
ney's fees ...."155 If "such relief as the court determines is appro­
priate" does not include damages, it is even less likely that it 
provides for an award of attorney fees. 
The legislative history is silent on this question and there appear 
to be no reported decisions, other than Anderson, on point. It is clear 
that attorney fees, however, are not available unless a case falls 
within one of the exceptions to the "American Rule" 156 which gener­
ally prohibits an award of fees. 157 While one of the exceptions is 
where Congress provides for fees by statute, this seems to apply only 
where Congress has made "specific and explicit provisions for the 
allowance of attorneys' fees...."158 Absent any authority on 
point, it would seem fair to say that a recovery of fees based on the 
language of section 6l5(e)(2) is highly unlikely .. 
C. The Rehabilitation Act oj'1973 
In contrast to the EAHCA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ex­
plicitly provides for attorney fees. It was amended in 1978 to add 
153. 20 U.S.c. § 14J5(e)(2) (1976). 
154. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. Although the coun in Ander­
son found that a limited damage award might be appropriate in two exceptional circum­
stances, it is not clear whether the coun found this to be expressly authorized by the 
statute or whether it is implied under the statute. 658 F.2d at 1210-14. In Miener v. 
Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 (1982), the coun stated that 
"[a)lthough some courts have asses5ed the availability of damages under a Cort v. Ash 
analysis, e.g., Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979), we eschew this 
approach in favor of the narrower focus adopted in Anderson . ..." fd. at 979. 
The "narrower focus" apparently refers to the question of whether Congress in­
tended damages to be included in "appropriate" relief. Several couns have agreed that 
damages are not available under the EAHCA. Davis v. Maine Endwell Cent. School 
Dist., 542 F. Supp. 1257, 1261 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Reineman v. Valley View Community 
School Dist., 527 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 
110, 115 (D. Conn. 1979). But see, Parks v. Parkovic, 536 F. Supp. 296, 311-13 (N. D. Ill. 
1982). 
155. Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d at 1217. 
156. See Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wildeness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260-62 
(1975). 
157. Id at 260. 
158. fd The coun cited several statutes in which Congress did make such specific 
and explicit provisions. fd at 260-61 n.33. 
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new section 505 which provides: "In any action or proceeding to 
enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this subchapter, the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costS."159 
Although the act refers to the discretion of the court, the language is 
almost identical to that in section 1988 under which a prevailing 
plaintiff is entitled to fees as a matter of course unless special circum­
stances would render an award unjust. l60 Because of the similarity 
in language and the legislative history, courts generally have recog­
nized that fee awards under section 505(b) "are governed by the 
same considerations controlling in section 1988 actions."lbl The leg­
islative history clearly supports these cases. 
Both the House Report '62 and the Senate Report '63 refer to the 
failure of section 504 to provide for attorney fees as an omission. 
The Senate Report refers to testimony which notes the unavailability 
of section 1988 and suggests the need for the same coverage. 1M Re­
marks made on the floor of the Senate are more explicit. Senator 
Cranston,165 author of the attorney fee provision in section 505, 
stated: 
I emphasize that it is intended that interpretation of the attorney's 
fee provision in the committee bill be analogous to interpretations 
of ... [section 1988]. The legislative history and expressions of 
legislative intent with respect to ... [section 1988] are applic'lble 
to the new section 505(b). Thus, for example, the discussion of 
"prevailing party" and "reasonable fees" found in the Senate 
Committee Report to accompany H.R. 15460 (H. Rept. No. 95­
1558), in particular pages 6 to 9, would be applicable whenever 
there is judicial consideration of the handicapped attorney's fees 
provision contained in proposed section 505(b).166 
Senator Cranston went on to highlight several points in stressing 
159. 29 U.S.c. § 794a(b) (Supp. v 1981). 
160. LARSON, supra note 24, at 33-83. 
161. Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs., 689 F.2d 724, 730 n.8 (7th Cir. 
1982); see also Disabled in Action v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 685 F.2d 881, 
885 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342, 345-48 (8th 
Cir. 1980). 
162. H.R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978). reprillled in 1978 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7312-32. 
163. S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1978). 
164. Itt. 
165. In Federal Energy Admin. V. Algonquin SNG, Inc .. 426 U.S. 548 (1976). the 
Court indicated that "a statement of one of the legislation's sponsors ... deserves to be 
accorded substantial weight in interpreting the statute." Itt. at 564. 
166. 124 CONGo REC. 30.346-47 (1978) (statement of Sen. Cranston). 
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the similarity. First, he indicated that a prevailing plaintiff should 
recover fees "unless special circumstances would render such an 
award unjust."167 Second, a party prevailing through a consent 
judgment or other settlement would be entitled to fees. 168 Third, 
since the authorization of fees under section 505(b) was based on the 
power of Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, it 
was anticipated that fees would be awarded against local and state 
governmental officials in their official capacity.169 Senator Cran­
ston's statements were repeated, nearly verbatim, by Senator Staf­
ford when he was commenting on the conference bill that ultimately 
passed. 170 Finally, Senator Cranston, in the discussion of the confer­
ence bill, emphasized the continuing applicability of his earlier re­
marks concerning attorney fees. 171 
It is quite apparent, therefore, that section 505(b) is just as 
favorable to prevailing plaintiffs as section 1988. A number of courts 
have awarded fees under section 505(b) to prevailing plaintiffs in 
special education cases.172 Courts in other special education cases 
have awarded fees under both section 1988 and section 505(b ).173 
Fees have also been awarded under section 505(b) in a variety of 
cases concerning the rights of persons with handicaps in areas other 
than elementary and secondary education. 174 
Although cases dealing with the elementary and secondary edu­
cation rights of children with handicaps are often brought under 
both the EAHCA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, it is not un­
167. ld at 30,347. 
168. ld 
169. ld 
170. ld at 37,507-08 (statement of Sen. Stafford). 
171. ld at 37,509 (statement of Sen. Cranston). 
172. See, e.g. ,Gregg B. v. Board of Educ., 535 F. Supp. 1333, 1340 (E.D.N.Y. 
1982); Patsel v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 660.666 (D.D.C. 1982); 
Davis v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 1215, 1217 (D.D.C. 1982): Fells 
v. Brooks, 522 F. Supp. 30, 33 (D.D.C. 1981); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of 
Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 57(N.D. Ala. 1981); Tatro v. Texas. 516 F. Supp. 968. 985-87 
(N.D. Tex. 1981). 
173. Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865, 871 (2d Cir. 1982); Depanment of Educ. v. 
Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517, 531-32 (D. Hawaii 1982); New Mexico Ass'n for Re­
tarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391, 399 (D.N.M. I 980).rev'd and remanded 
on orher grounds, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982). 
174. Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs .. 689 F.2d 724. 730-31 (7th Cir. 
1982); Disabled in Action v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore. 685 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 
1982); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1980); Pushkin v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 504 F. Supp. 1292 (D. Colo.). aJrd. 658 F.2d 1372 
(lOth Cir. 1981). 
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common for a court expressly to decide only the EAHCA claim. 175 
As discussed in the previous section, the availability of fees to pre­
vailing plaintiffs under the EAHCA is not at all clear and, therefore, 
prevailing plaintiffs prefer to seek fees under section 505(b). A prob­
lem arises, however, when the court either does not indicate which 
statute it is relying upon in ruling for the plaintiffs or rules:in favor 
of the plaintiff on the EAHCA claim without deciding the Rehabili­
tation Act claim. In such a situation, the prevailing plaintiffs can 
advance two arguments in'support of a request for fees under section 
505(b). 
The first, and most desirable argument, is that the regulations 
implementing section 504176 provide essentially the same rights to 
elementary and secondary school children as the EAHCA and, 
therefore, plaintiffs. ~ho prevail under the EAHCA automatically 
are entitled to fees under section 505(b). This overlap or close rela­
tionship between the EAHCA and section 504 has been. recognized 
by the courts. For example, in Kaelin v. Grubbs 177 the court stated: 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. . . complements the Hand­
icapped Children Act. Section 504 bars discrimination against 
handicapped persons by programs or activities receiving federal 
financial assistance. Many of the procedural protections provided 
in the. Handicapped Children Act are also contained in Section 
504's implementing regulations. . . . Specifically, the regulations 
provide that plenary due process procedures govern the identifica-' 
tion, evaluation, and· educational placement of a handicapped 
child....178 
175. Compare Doe v. Koger. 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979) wilh Anderson v. 
Thompson. 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981). where the court did not have to consider an 
award of fees under section 505(b) because a section 504 claim was not alleged in the 
complaint. fa. at 1217 n.20. . 
176.' 45 C.F.R. § 84.1-.6 (1982). 
177. 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982). 
178. fa. at 597 (citations omitted). Compare Robert M. v. Benton. 671 F.2d 1104. 
1106 (8th Cir. 1982); Jose P. v. Ambach. 669 F.2d 865. 871 (2d Cir. 1982); Hymes v. 
Harnett County Bd. of Educ.• 664 F.2d 410. 413 n.4 (4th Cir. 1981); S-1 v. Turlington. 
635 F.2d 342. 350 (5th Cir.). cerro denied. 454 U.S. 1030 (1981); Mitchell v. Walter. 538 F. 
Supp. 1111. 1116-17 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Patsel V. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ.• 530 F. 
Supp. 660. 662-63 (D.D.C. 1982); Foster V. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ.• 523 F. 
Supp. 1142. 1144 (D.D.C. 1981); Davis V. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ.• 522 F. 
Supp. 1102. 1105 (D.D.C. 1981); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ.. 518 F. 
Supp. 47.51 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Frazier. 517 F. Supp. 
105. 118-23 (D. Colo. 1981); North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ.. 471 F. Supp. 
136. 139-40 (D.D.C. 1979); Howard V. Friendswood Indep. School Dist .. 454 F. Supp. 
634.637-38 (S.D. Tex. 1978) wilh Monahan v. Nebraska. 687 F.2d 1164. 1169-71 (8th 
Cir. 1982). For an application of section 504 to a state which does not participate in the 
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The elementary and secondary education portion of the regula­
tions implementing section 504179 supports the decisions which inter­
pret section 504 as coextensive with the EAHCAISO While section 
504 was passed prior to the effective date of the relevant amend­
ments to the EAHCA, the implementing regulations were not 
adopted by HEW until it was ordered to do so by a federal court; 
this was after the passage of the 1975 amendments to the EAHCAISI 
In adopting the section 504 regulations, HEW was obviously con­
cerned with the procedural rights of students with handicaps in 
states which chose not to accept federal funding under the EAHCA 
This is evident from the commentary to the regulation. ls2 
This commentary further indicates that the subpart dealing with 
elementary and secondary education "generally conforms to the 
standards established for the education of handicapped persons in 
[several cases) as well as in the [EAHCA)."ls3 
If the EAHCA and section 504 are indeed coextensive, as sug­
gested by the cases cited previouslylS4 and the regulations imple­
menting section 504,185 then a plaintiff prevailing under the EAHCA 
should automatically be entitled to fees under section 505(b), regard­
less of whether the court explicitly rules on the section 504 claim. 
funding available under the EAHCA. see New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. 
New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391 (D.N.M. 1980), rev'd and remanded. 678 F.2d 847 (10th 
CiT. 1982) ("[e)vidence of the State's alleged [s)ection 504 violations must be evaluated by 
the trial court in light of the Supreme Court's determination [in Southeastern Commu­
nity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979») that the statute and its regulations are 
designed to prohibit discrimination rather than require affirmative action"). 
179. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.31-.39 (1982). 
180. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
181. See Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976). 
182. The commentary to the regulation states: 
Under § 84.36. a recipient must establish a system of due process procedures to 
be afforded to parents or guardians before the recipient takes any action regard­
ing the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a person. who. 
because of handicap, needs or is believed to need special education or related 
services. This section has been revised. Because the due process procedures of 
the EHA. incorporated by reference in the proposed section 504 regulation. are 
inappropriate for some recipients not subject to that Act. the section now speci­
fies minimum necessary procedures: notice, a right to inspect records, an im­
partial hearing with the right to representation by counsel, and a review 
procedure. The EHA procedures remain one means of meeting the regulation'S 
due process requirements, however, and are recommended to recipients as a 
model. 
45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A ~ 125 (1982); see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.36 (1982). 
183. 45 C.F .R. § 84, app. A ~ 21 (1982). 
184. See supra note 178. 
185. See supra note 176. 
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This is consistent with the situation where a non-fee statutory claim 
is joined with a substantial constitutional claim and fees are sought 
under section 1988. As indicated previously, the legislative history 
suggests that the plaintiff who prevails on the non-fee claim should 
be awarded fees without requiring the court to reach the constitu­
tional question. 186 Several cases have relied on this legislative his­
tory}87 It must be recognized that this analogy to cases with 
statutory and constitutional claims has its limitations because the 
strong policy against unnecessarily deciding constitutional issues 
does not apply to cases presenting two statutory claims}88 Neverthe­
less, judicial economy certainly argues against requiring the courts to 
rule on a statutory claim that is relevant only to the attorney fee 
issue. This is particularly true in this situation because, even if a 
court concludes that the EAHCA and section 504 are not coexten­
sive, where a plaintiff prevails under the EAHCA, the section 504 
claim is certainly substantial. 
An alternative is to require the court to rule on both the 
EAHCA and section 504 claims. While it seems to run contrary to 
considerations of judicial economy, there is some support in the leg­
islative history to section 1988 for·this alternative}89 In passing sec­
tion 1988, Congress anticipated that some cases would include both 
fee and non-fee statutory claims. 
To the extent a plaintiff joins a claim under Olle of the statutes 
enumerated in [the fees act] with a claim that does not allow attor­
ney fees, that plaiDtiff, if it prevails on the non-fee claim, is enti­
tled to a determination on the other claim for the purpose of 
awarding counsel fees. l90 
The legislative history cites Morales v. Haines,191 but it does not ac­
tually support the conclusion reached. In Morales, the district court 
ruled in favor of plaintiff on his constitutional claim and the appel­
late court remanded the case for a determination of the statutory 
186. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
187. See supra note 21. 
188. See Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 586 n.12 (D. R.I. 1982). 
189. The greater the coun perceives the difference between the two acts, the more 
additional time it will take to decide both claims. See Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 
1164, 1169-71 (1982). On the other hand, if the coun concludes that the two statutes 
provide essentially the same rights, then ruling on both will not require additional coun 
time. 
190. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976) (citation omitted). 
191. 349 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1972), offd in pari, vacated and remanded in part. 
486 F .2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973). . 
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claims l92 because of the request for damages and attorney fees. 193 
The court, therefore, had to decide the statutory claims for purposes 
of relief other than attorney fees. 194 
As a matter of policy, where the plaintiff prevails under the 
EAHCA and a claim for the same relief under section 504 is at least 
substantial, fees should be awarded under section 505(b) without a 
formal ruling on the section 504 claim. Where the court views the 
section 504 claim as questionable,19s then it should proceed and de­
cide the merits of the section 504 claim unless fees are awarded 
under section 1988. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs in suits to enforce the elementary and secondary edu­
cational rights of children with handicaps have three federal sources 
of substantive rights: the fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution;196 the EAHCA;197 and section 504 of the Rehabilita­
tion Act of 1973}98 The strongest ofthese three in terms of substan­
tive rights is the EAHCA and, unfortunately, it presents the greatest 
difficulty in seeking an award of attorney fees. Plaintiffs prevailing 
under either the Constitution or section 504 are in a very good posi­
tion to recover fees under sections 1988 and 505(b). Therefore, in 
most situations plaintiffs should assert claims under all three 
provisions. 
A claim under the fourteenth amendment is both the most diffi­
cult to win on the merits and the least likely to be decided by the 
court. It is not necessary, however, to prevail on this claim in order 
to recover fees under section 1988.199 To the extent that plaintiffs 
can convince the Court that the fourteenth amendment claim is sub­
stantial, fees can be awarded under that section. The substantiality 
of the fourteenth amendment claim will usually be addressed by the 
court when deciding defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to 
192. Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973). These included claims under 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983 as well as under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 3604,3612. 
Id at 88l. 
193. Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 1973). 
194. It is not clear why the constitutional claim was decided before the statutory 
claims. 
195. This would usually occur in a situation where the court is concerned about the 
questions raised in Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 (8th Cir. 1982). 
196. See SIIpra note l. 
197. See SIIpra note 2. 
198. See SIIpra note 3. 
199. See SIIpra text accompanying notes 10-32. 
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state a claim. Under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Hagans v. Lavine ,200 the constitutional claim should normally sur­
vive a motion to dismiss. Assuming there is a constitutional basis for 
the relief sought in the complaint, denial of the motion to dismiss 
should assure an award of attorney fees under section 1988 if the 
plaintiff ultimately prev~ils .on a statutory claim. 
Concerning the statutory claims under the EAHCA and section 
504, it is generally advisable for plaintiff to pursue relief under both. 
That is, in seeking relief-whether in the form of a request for a 
preliminary injunction, a motion for summary judgment, or at 
trial-plaintiff should attempt to pursue these two claims as one. 
The goal is, of course, to have the court rule in favor of plaintiff on 
the basis of both the EAHCA. and section 504. If this is accom­
plished, then plaintiff is entitled to fees under either section 1988, 
because of the substantial constitutional claim, or section 505(b), be­
cause of the successful claim under section 504. 
It is entirely possible that the court will want to avoid ruling on 
the section 504 claim because of the potential problems suggested by 
the Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis .201 
When this happens, plaintiff should pursue relief on the merits under 
the EAHCA and, only after prevailing under that statute, address 
the fee issue. Again, if there is a substantial constitutional claim 
under the fourteenth amendment, plaintiff should recover fees with­
out resort to section 505(b). On the other hand, if there is not a sub­
stantial constitutional claim, then plaintiff will have to ask the court 
to rule on the section 504 claim solely for the purpose of awarding 
fees- or seek fees pursuant to section 1988 on the theory that the 
EAHCA can be enforced through section 1983. 
In order to preserve all options relating to attorney fees, plaintiff 
should exhaust state administrative remedies under the EAHCA, as­
suming adequate remedies are available and exhaustion would not 
be futile. Section 615 of the EAHCA expressly requires resort to 
state mandated administrative remedies before bringing an action in 
court; courts; however, have recognized the normal exceptions to the 
exhaustion requirement.202 While most courts have not required ex­
200. 415 U.S. 528, 534-43 (1974). 
201. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). The Court stated that. "[s)ection 504 imposes no require­
ment upon an educational institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications of 
standards to accommodate a handicapped person." fd at 413. See, e.g .. Monahan v. 
Nebraska. 687 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 (8th Cir. 1982); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 
1375, 1388 (D.R.l. 1982); Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 586-88 (D.R.L 1982). 
202. See supra note 134. 
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haustion prior to bringing a section 504 claim in court,203 if it is nec­
essary to exhaust these remedies under the EAHCA, there is 
generally no reason not to exhaust all available administrative reme­
dies and raise all claims. 
Exhaustion is not required in a section 1983 action to enforce 
the fourteenth amendment.204 Assuming administrative proceedings 
are pursued, all legal claims should be raised before the administra­
tive agency. This not only precludes a later assertion by the defend­
ants that only some claims were exhausted, it also lays the 
groundwork for an award of fees for the time spent in pursuing ad­
ministrative proceedings.205 
Plaintiffs prevailing in cases to enforce the educational rights of 
children with handicaps should normally be allowed to recover fees 
under either section 198~ or section 505(b). Yet, because the 
EAHCA does not itself provide for fees and because the availability 
of section 1983 to enforce the EAHCA is uncertain, the issue is not 
as clear, nor as simple as advocates of children with handicaps 
would prefer. 
203. See, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 978 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied. 103 S. 
Ct. 215 (1982). The court cited cases on both sides of the exhaustion issue. Id at 978-79 
n.lO. 
204. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982). Some courts have sug· 
gested that section 1983 cannot be utilized to enforce the EAHCA unless the state admin· 
istrative remedies mandated by section 615 are exhausted. H.R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F. 
Supp. 215, 222-23 (D. Md. 1981); Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 984 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
This is not necessarily inconsistent with Palsy because the Court indicated exhaustion 
would still be required prior to suing under section 1983 where Congress makes an ex· 
ception to the no·exhaustion rule. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. at 2564-66. See 
Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 583 n.4 (D.R.I. 1982). 
205. See, e.g., Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577,583 (D. R.I. 1982); Department of 
Educ. v. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517, 531 (D. Hawaii 1982); Patsel v. District of 
Columbia Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 660, 667 (D.D.C. 1982). The Supreme Court has 
approved fees for work done in connection with administrative proceedings mandated by 
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2000e·17 (1976 & Supp. IV 
1980). New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54,61-63 (1980). 
